The locus coeruleus (LC) in the pons is the major source of noradrenaline (NA) in the brain. Two modes 17 of LC firing have been associated with distinct cognitive states: changes in tonic rates of firing are 18 correlated with global levels of arousal and behavioural flexibility, whilst phasic LC responses are 19 evoked by salient stimuli. Here, we unify these two modes of firing by modelling the response of the LC 20 as a correlate of a prediction error when inferring states for action planning under Active Inference 21
We simulate a classic Go/No-go reward learning task and a three-arm foraging task and show that, if 23 LC activity is considered to reflect the magnitude of high level 'state-action' prediction errors, then both 24 tonic and phasic modes of firing are emergent features of belief updating. We also demonstrate that 25 when contingencies change, AI agents can update their internal models more quickly by feeding back 26 this state-action prediction error -reflected in LC firing and noradrenaline release -to optimise 27 learning rate, enabling large adjustments over short timescales. We propose that such prediction 28 errors are mediated by cortico-LC connections, whilst ascending input from LC to cortex modulates 29 belief updating in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) . 30
In short, we characterise the LC/ NA system within a general theory of brain function. In doing so, we 31
show that contrasting, behaviour-dependent firing patterns are an emergent property of the LC's 32 crucial role in translating prediction errors into an optimal mediation between plasticity and stability. 33 34 Author Summary 35 The brain uses sensory information to build internal models and make predictions about the world. 36
When errors of prediction occur, models must be updated to ensure desired outcomes are still 37 achieved. Neuromodulator chemicals provide a possible pathway for triggering such changes in brain 38 state. One such neuromodulator, noradrenaline, originates predominantly from a cluster of neurons 39 in the brainstem -the locus coeruleus (LC) -and plays a key role in behaviour, for instance, in 40 determining the balance between exploiting or exploring the environment. 41
Here we use Active Inference (AI), a mathematical model of perception and action, to formally 42 describe LC function. We propose that LC activity is triggered by errors in prediction and that the 43 subsequent release of noradrenaline alters the rate of learning about the environment. Biologically, 44 this describes an LC-cortex feedback loop promoting behavioural flexibility in times of uncertainty. 45 4 A series of studies has provided evidence of further nuance to phasic LC responses. Similar to the well-70 known dopaminergic response, as an animal learns a cue-reward relationship, phasic LC responses will 71 transfer from temporal alignment with an unconditioned stimuli (US) to a predictive, conditioned 72 stimuli (CS+) (1, 13) . Additionally, rarer stimuli, or those predicting a large reward, elicit a stronger LC 73 response (6, 8) . In contrast if predictive cues are delivered consecutively, the size of the response 74 appears to decrease (6). The rich array of factors affecting the nature of the phasic response suggests 75 that LC activation is linked to both facilitation of behavioural response and to internal representations 76 of uncertainties and probabilities. 77
Despite the increasing body of knowledge about the impact of the LC on behaviour, a comprehensive 78 computational account remains elusive -in contrast to the more developed account of other 79 neuromodulators; most notably dopamine, which has been interpreted as a signal of reward 80 prediction error. In particular, existing modelling approaches have generally tackled the tonic and 81 phasic firing responses of the LC as separate modes with distinct functional significance, triggered by 82 different circumstances (4,5,9,10). 83
Here, we propose that a critical computational role of the LC-NA system is to react to high level 'state-84 action' prediction errors upstream of the LC and cause appropriate flexibility in belief updating via 85 feedback projections to cortex. In brief, our account of noradrenergic activity is based on the fact that 86 the degree of belief updating reflects volatility in the environment and can therefore inform the 87 optimal rate of evidence accumulation and plasticity. The 'state-action' prediction error considered in 88 this work is the 'Bayesian surprise' or change in probabilistic beliefs before and after observing some 89 outcome. We develop these ideas as neural correlates of discrete updates and action planning under 90 the formalism of Active Inference (AI). AI offers an effective mathematical framework for such 91 modelling, unifying inferences on states and action planning and providing a detailed description of 92 beliefs at each step of a behavioural task (14-17). In taking this formal approach, our description of 93 the LC is integrated into a general theory of the brain function and uses constructs that underwrite 94 5 the normal cycle of perceptual inference and action selection. This contrasts with previous LC 95 modelling approaches, which have invoked the monitoring of statistical quantities (such as 96 unexpected uncertainty) per se. 97
In the following we apply AI to simulate the updating of beliefs about states of the world -and actions 98 -as a synthetic agent engages with two scenarios (a Go/No-go task with reversal and a foraging task) 99 that elicit archetypal LC responses. Using this approach, we show that the 'state-action prediction 100 error' offers an effective predictor of LC firing over both long (tonic) and short (phasic) timescales, 101 without the need to invoke switches between distinct modes. Furthermore, we described how the 102 signal may be broadcast back to cortex to affect appropriate updates to internal models of the 103 environment. This links the error via the LC to model flexibility -bringing two key concepts of the LC 104 together: 'explore-exploit' and 'network reset'. It also produces behavioural changes that agree with 105 experimental knowledge of animal behaviours under noradrenergic manipulation. Finally, the 106 simulations produce realistic LC firing patterns that could, in principle, be used to model empirical 107 responses. 108
109

Methods and Modelling
110
Brief overview of Active Inference 111
Active Inference is a theory of behaviour that has previously been mapped to putative neural 112 implementations (14). The basic premise of AI is that to stay in states compatible with survival, an 113 agent must create and update a generative model of the world (14, 18, 19) . To do this effectively the 114 agent represents the true structure of the world with an internal model that is a good approximation 115 of how its sensations are generated. (Note that in this paper, we often use the term 'model' to refer 116 to the agent's beliefs about states and actions in the world. Technically, these beliefs are posterior 117 probability distributions, which require a generative model to exist.) 118 6
The generative model encompasses a set of discrete states and transition patterns that 119 probabilistically capture all the agent's beliefs about the world and likely outcomes under different 120 actions. The model is formulated as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), under 121 which the agent must infer its current state, make predictions about the outcome of actions in the 122 future and make postdictions about the landscape it has just traversed. In this context the word 'state' 123 refers to a combination of features relevant to the agent, including its location and the cognitive 124 context of that location; i.e., states of the world that matter for its behaviour. 125 To optimise this model, the agent constantly seeks to minimise variational free energy. This free 126 energy is a mathematical proxy for the difference between the agent's generative model and a 127 'perfect' or 'true' model of the world, and thus must be continually updated for the agent to survive. 128
Estimates of the free energy can be obtained over time by comparing predictions from the generative 129 model with the results of actions in the real world, for instance, by checking whether an action 130 produces the expected sensory feedback. Using this information from the real world, the agent can There are two more subtleties that should be noted in this brief description. Firstly, action selection is 146 driven by twin goals -the future attainment of states that the agent holds valuable (utility), as well as 147 the attainment of information when performing an action (epistemic value). Formally, these describe 148 the path integral of free energy expected under competing policies. Thus, agents that act to minimise 149 free energy will end up where they hoped to, while resolving uncertainty about their environment. If 150 policies do not differ in their ability to resolve uncertainty (i.e. no policy will harvest more information) 151 then utility will drive policy selection. It has already been established that this particular cost function 152 explores and exploits in a predictable and mathematically well-defined manner, depending on the 153 relative utility of outcomes and on the uncertainty with which the agent views its environment (15-154 17,20) . 155
The second important component is the timespan covered by inferences. The agent continually 156 updates its understanding of the past, the present and the future. This means that observations in the 157 present can be used to update inferences on states that occurred in the past -in this way, past events 158 continue to be useful for belief updating long after they occurred. This is just a formalisation of our 159 ability to postdict (e.g., "I started in this context, even if I didn't know at the time"). Equally, the agent's 160 knowledge of the world is used to form predictions at future times (e.g., "These are the outcomes I 161 expect under this policy"). The agent not only attempts to use events that have already happened to 162 minimise free energy, but also tries to select actions and inferences which it believes will minimise 163 free energy of future observations. 164 165 A Bayesian Model Average drives action selection 166 8 As outlined in Boxes 1 and 2, the generative model comprises probability distributions over states, 167 sequences of actions, precision (confidence in predictions) and observations. The agent also holds 168 prior beliefs about the way these variables interact, for instance, the probability that a particular state 169 will result in a specific observable outcome. At each time step, the agent updates its beliefs about 170 these probability distributions over states, actions and precision by minimising free energy. 171
Once all updates have been completed the agent combines all of its inferences to produce a Bayesian 172
Model Average (BMA) of states under possible actions. This can be considered as a summary of 173 everything the agent knows about its place in the world -an overall 'map' of the states it believes it 174 occupied in the past, the state it occupies now and the states it believes it will occupy in the future. 175
The distribution implicitly includes action planning that is informed by inferences about events in the 176 past. These probabilities can be represented as a 'state-action heatmap' showing how the likelihood 177 of different states evolves over time as evidence accumulates and beliefs are updated (see Figure 1 ). 178
The Bayesian Model Average is then used by the agent to select an action, generating an observation 179 which forms the basis of the next cycle of updates. 180 181
State-action Prediction Errors as a driver of LC activity 182
Any large change in the state-action heatmap between time steps represents a state-action prediction 14)). 233
In the context of reversal learning, this is not a trivial adjustment but a crucial addition to the 234 generative model which enables AI agents to adapt flexibly. However, the level at which to set the 235 decay term poses a further challenge: if the decay is too big, the model is too flexible and will be 236 dominated by its most recent experiences (as all the other terms will have decayed). If the decay is 237 too small concentration parameters may accumulate too slowly, rendering the model too stable. 238
11
There are several ways one can optimise this 'forgetting' in volatility models. One could equip the 239 Markov decision process with a further hierarchical level modelling fluctuations from trial to trial -as 240 in the hierarchical Gaussian filter (21). A simpler (and biologically plausible) solution is to link the decay 241 factor to recent values of state-action prediction error via the LC. In other words, equip the agent with 242 the prior belief that if belief updating is greater than expected, environmental contingencies have 243 become more volatile. 244
This produces flexibility in model learning when prediction error is high (low α) but maintains model 245 stability when prediction error is low (high α). We have modelled this feedback using a simple logistic 246 function to convert prediction error into a value for : 247
where PE is the prediction error seen during the trial (in tasks with more than one prediction error 249 per trial, the maximum error is used), k is a gradient and m is a mean (i.e., expected) value. In all 250 simulations presented below, ∝ =2, ∝ =32, k=8, and m is set as a proportion of the maximum 251 prediction error possible in each task. The simulations reported in this paper suggest that behavioural contexts that produce large state-263 action prediction errors are also those that produce archetypal LC responses in experimental 264 environments. Below, we describe the emergence of phasic and tonic activity in two tasks, as a 265 response to changes in prediction error. We initially present results without the LC feedback in place 266 before showing how both simulations are improved by modelling the LC as a link between prediction 267 errors and model decay / volatility. 268 269
Go/No-go task 270
A simple 'Go-No-Go' game modelled under AI is shown in Figure 1 (using MATLAB code based on (14)). 271
In this game, the agent (depicted as a rat) starts in a 'ready' state -location 1 -and must move to 272 location 2 to receive a cue. When the cue is received the agent may either move back to location 1 or 273
seek a reward at location 3. The agent has a strong preference for receiving the reward but an 274 aversion to moving to location 3 and remaining unrewarded. This is represented in the game by a graphically as a state-action heatmap. Figure 1(b) shows a representation of the agent's beliefs about 292 states at the beginning of a new trial in which the 'Go' cue is heard. The agent is 'well trained'; that is, 293 it has an accurate understanding of the relationship between the cue and the availability of the 294 reward, and of the fact that the 'Go' cue is rare (here, the cue probability is 10%). In our modelling, 295
we trained the synthetic rat by running the simulation for 750 trials. We then used the learnt priors as 296 the starting point for the 'well trained' case. 297
Given its knowledge of the game, the agent begins with a strong belief that it is beginning the trial in 298 state 2 (in which a reward will not be available). It also makes predictions for the states it believes it 299 will occupy later in the trial: at t=2, it believes it is likely to occupy state 4 -corresponding to the 300 occurrence of the 'No-go' cue, but also entertains a slight possibility that the 'Go' cue might still 301 appear. The agent is much less certain in its predictions for t=3, but still holds a higher probability that 302 it will end up in one of the unrewarded end states. 303 At the next time point (at t=2, Fig. 1(c) ), the agent updates its state-action heatmap, making new 304 inferences on the probabilities of different states in the past, present and future, based on its most 305 recent observations. If it has received the rare 'Go' cue, it will have to update its predictions for its 306 state at the end of the game, in addition to altering its inferences about the state in which it started 307 at t=1 (a process of postdiction about past states based on new information). The agent therefore has 308 to make a large, sudden update to its BMA heatmap at t=2. By t=3 ( Fig. 1(d) ), the agent has received 309 14 the reward as predicted, and knows with certainty where it is and where it has been. Only small 310 updates are required to its estimates at this point. 311
Simulated prediction errors during this task are shown in Figure 2 , in which LC firing is modelled by 312 converting the prediction error to a firing probability via a sigmoid activation function. In this 313 simulation the prediction error does not modulate learning and the decay parameter α has been set 314 to a fixed value. During the task, an agent who is well trained shows large peaks of state-action 315 prediction error when the reward-predicting cue is presented, resulting in phasic activity in the LC as 316 seen experimentally (6,22). The underlying reason for this error is a large, quick shift in action planning, 317 from the (more likely) 'No-go' outcome to the rare 'Go' situation. 318 319 320
Figure 2 Plot of prediction error (a), simulated LC spiking (b) and behaviour (c) during 100 trials of 321
the Go/No-Go task described in main text. 322
In (a) the raw prediction error is extracted for t=2, when the animal receives a cue (this is the error 323 between t=1 and t=2) and t=3 when the animal receives feedback on its response to the cue (the error 324 between t=2 and t=3). Because the prediction error explicitly evaluates differences between update 325 cycles, there is no error available for the first time point. Each trial has therefore been collapsed to 326 two time points, each lasting 1 second. In (a) the occurrence of the 'Go' cue causes strong peaks in 327 prediction error. This is converted into a simulated LC firing rate in (b), showing phasic LC activation 328 when the 'go' cue is heard. Plot (c) is a graphical representation of behaviour during the task at times 329 t=2 and t=3. 330
332
Foraging 333 15 To supplement the above go no-go task we modelled a foraging task, depicted in Figure 3 . On every 334 trial in this task the agent searches for a reward in one of three arms. In one arm, the probability of 335 finding a reward is high (90%), whilst in the others the probability is low (10%). The probabilities are 336 held constant for a set number of trials, during which time the agent accumulates beliefs about the 337 likelihood of finding a reward in each location. Typically, once the agent has been rewarded in one 338 location numerous times it will build a strong prior probability on the availability of a reward in that 339 location (reflected in updates to elements of the B matrix). In the example shown in Figure 3 When the full feedback loop between prediction error and model decay is introduced, there are 361 improvements in performance in the simulations of both the Go/No-go and Foraging tasks (Figure 4) . 362
One consequence during the Go/No-go game is that multiple consecutive 'go' trials produce clearly 363 reduced peak heights (as has been recorded in terms of LC activation in the same context (6)). This is 364 due to the continual modulation of the agent's prior beliefs about whether each trial will be a Go or 365
No-Go context (encoded by d parameters that accumulate experience about initial states). With a brief 366 high prediction error, the update prioritises the recent experiences of the agent: after a few 367 consecutive 'Go' trials this creates a distribution with a higher probability of the 'Go' context than 368 would be suggested by the statistics of the rat's entire experience in the game. 369
In the foraging task, the dynamic modulation of model building allows prediction errors to reduce 370 more quickly when the rat is settled into the 'exploit' mode of harvesting a reward in a reliable 371 location, promoting model stability (Figure 4b ). When the reward is no longer available, errors mount 372 and the increase in model decay causes the agent to make more explorative choices. This contrasts 373 with the same task simulated with fixed values of α ( Figure 5 ): when the model is hyper-flexible, the 374 agent often switches behavioural strategy after a single failed trial; when the model is inflexible, the 375 agent takes a large number of trials to visit a new location. Over multiple trials, the agent with a 376 dynamically varying α consistently secures more rewards than agents with fixed α values taken from 377 the same range (Figure 5c ). 378
Finally, the application of this scheme to a reversal learning scenario under the Go/No-Go game is 379 described in Figure 6 The agent begins with a well-trained understanding (via 750 trials of training) that cue 2 indicates that 409 a reward is available. At trial 35 (t=70) the cue/context relationship is reversed, and the agent must 410 now learn that cue 1 indicates the 'Go' context. This initially causes numerous unsuccessful trials, 411 violating the learnt model and producing high prediction errors (a). Note that prediction errors are 412 initially elevated at both timepoints in each trial because both the previously rare cue and the 413 subsequent lack of reward are unexpected. These prediction errors result in a lowering in the 414 parameter decay factor (b), which in turn flattens the agent's priors causing more variability in 415 behaviour. Eventually the agent learns the new contingencies and the model stabilises, with the re-416 emergence of phasic bursts of LC activity on 'Go' trials (a, c). From trial 125 onwards, the peak of phasic 417 activity begins to transition towards the presentation of the cue rather than the reward. This is also 418 seen during the training period of the well-trained agent shown in Figure 2 and 4(a) . In previous Active Inference literature the calculation of Bayesian Model Averages has been mapped 445 to the dorsal prefrontal cortex (14). This is one of the frontal regions known to send projections to LC 446 (25,26) and is a candidate for the calculation of state-action prediction error (although we accept that 447 without further experimental work such anatomical attributions are largely speculative). 448
Experimental evidence for a neural representation of a distinct prediction error based on states, 449 rather than rewards, has also been found in dorsal regions of the frontal cortex in a human MRI study 450 (27) . 451
Turning to the LC-prefrontal connections and the modulation of model updating, converging 452 experimental evidence suggests that working models of the environment are reflected by ACC 453 activity. Activity in the ACC has been shown to correlate to many factors relevant to the maintenance 454 of a generative model, including reward magnitude and probability (for review see (28)), estimation 455 20 of the value of action sequences and subsequent prediction errors (29,30) and the value of switching 456 behavioural strategies (31). Marked changes in activity in ACC have been observed at times thought 457
to coincide with significant model updating and occur in parallel with explorative behaviour -an event 458 that has been directly linked to increased input from locus coeruleus (3, 32) . Similarly, a direct ACC/ 459 LC connection has also been found in response to task conflicts (33). ACC activity is also correlated 460 with learning rate during times of volatility, such that when the statistics of the environment change, 461 more recent observations are weighted more heavily in preference to historical information (34). This 462 evidence provides a solid foundation for the hypothesis that the LC modulates learning rate by 463 governing model updating via ACC. Specifically, we propose that the release of noradrenaline would 464 cause a temporary increase in the susceptibility of model-holding networks to new information. At a 465 cellular level, this would lead to NA effectively breaking and reshaping connections amongst cell 466
assemblies. 467
In vitro investigation of the cellular effects of noradrenaline provides support for this idea, indicating 468 that noradrenaline may suppress intrinsic connectivity of cortical neurons, causing a relative 469 enhancement of afferent input (1, 35, 36) . Sara (37) and Harley (38) also suggest that LC spiking 470 synchronises oscillations at theta and gamma frequencies, allowing effective transfer of information 471 between brain regions during periods of LC activity. This may allow enhanced updating of existing 472 models with more recent observations. A role for the LC in prioritising recent observations during 473 times of environmental volatility has been explicitly suggested experimentally (39) and is supported 474 by evidence regarding the critical role of LC activation in reversal learning, e.g. (40). 475
We note that if the LC is indeed responding to prediction errors, model updating is likely not the only 476 functionality it has. For instance, LC activation has been experimentally linked to the potentiation of 477 memory formation (37,41,42), analgesic effects (43,44) and changes to sensory perception for stimuli 478 occurring at the time of LC activation (1, 45, 46) . These are all reasonable responses to a large 479 prediction error: the increase in gain on sensory input may ensure that salient stimuli are more easily 480 21 detectable in the future, whilst enhanced formation of memory might ensure that mappings between 481 salient stimuli and states are remembered over longer timeframes. Similarly, the temporary 482 suppression of pain may facilitate urgent physical responses to important stimuli (for instance, 483 allowing action in response to a stimulus indicating the presence of a predator). The possibility that 484 the LC has the capacity to provide a differentiated response to prediction error is supported by recent 485 work indicating that existence of distinct subunits with preferred targets producing different 486 functional effects (44,47-49). 487
488
Relationship to existing models of LC function 489
The ideas described above are not a radical departure from existing models of LC function -but use 490 the theory of active inference to integrate similar concepts into a general theory of brain function, 491 without invoking the need for monitoring of ad-hoc statistical quantities. 492
The adaptive gain theory proposed by Aston Jones and Cohen (4) proposes that the LC responds to 493 ongoing assessments of utility in OFC and ACC by altering the global 'gain' of the brain (the responsivity 494 of individual units). Phasic activation produces a widespread increase in gain which enables a more 495 efficient behavioural response following a task-related decision; however, when the utility of a task 496 decreases, the LC switches to a tonic mode which favours task disengagement and a switch from 497 'exploit' to 'explore'. 498
The mechanism we have described reproduces many elements of the adaptive gain theory, with the 499 important exception that different LC firing patterns promoting explorative or exploitative behaviour 500 are an emergent property of the model rather than a dichotomy imposed by design. Since the 501 probability assigned to individual policies is explicitly dependent on their utility (in combination with 502 their epistemic value) a large state-action prediction error will ultimately reflect changes in the 503 availability of policies which lead to high utility outcomes. This may be a positive change, as is the case 504 when a cue indicates that a 'Go' policy will secure a reward, or a negative change, when rewards are 505 no longer available in the foraging task. This link is demonstrated in Figure 4 for the foraging task, 506
where increases in prediction error / LC firing occur in tandom with abrupt changes in the agent's 507 assessment of a given policy's utility. Both the LC response, and the underlying cause (prediction 508 error), show a shift between 'phasic' and 'tonic' modes (although it is entirely possible that coupling 509 mechanisms within the LC also act to exaggerate the shift and cause the LC to fire in a more starkly bi-510 modal fashion, as suggested by computational modelling of the LC (4,50)). As described above, a short 511 prediction error will act to heighten the response to a salient cue over the short term, whilst a large, 512 sustained prediction error -occurring in parallel with declining utility in a task -will act to make 513 behaviour more exploratory. promotes rapid re-organisation of neural networks to accomplish shifts in behavioural mode (10), see 523 also (9). Large changes in configuration of the state-action heatmap alongside the updates to internal 524 models above would similarly constitute network re-organisations with the result of changing 525 behaviour. Importantly, state-action updates precede action selection, placing LC activation after 526 decision making / classification of stimuli, but before the behavioural response. This order of events 527 is in keeping with experimental evidence showing that LC responses do indeed consistently precede 528 behavioural responses (51,52). This also parallels the 'neural interrupt' model of phasic noradrenaline 529 23 proposed by Dayan and Yu (53) , in which uncertainties over states within a task are signalled by phasic 530 bursts of noradrenaline, causing an interrupt signal during which new states can be adopted. 531
More recently Parr et al have described an alternative active inference-based model of noradrenaline 532 in decision making (54). Under this model, noradrenaline and acetylcholine are related to the precision 533 assigned to beliefs about outcomes and beliefs about state transitions. That is, the agent assigns a 534 different weight to any inferences made using the A matrix (modulated by release of acetylcholine) or 535 the B matrix (modulated by noradrenaline) in its updates. This approach captures some of the 536 interplay between environmental uncertainty and release of noradrenaline. Our formulation also 537 speaks to these uncertainties -without the need to introduce new volatility parameters, or to 538 segregate cholinergic / noradrenergic response into separate modulators of likelihood and transition 539 (i.e., A and B matrices). Both approaches target the coding of contingencies in terms of connectivity 540 (i.e., probability matrices). Parr et al consider the optimisation of the precision of contingencies. 541
Conversely, we consider the optimisation of precision from the point of view of optimal learning rates. 542
In other words, the confidence or precision of beliefs about outcomes likelihoods and state transitions 543 can itself be optimised based on inference (about states) or learning (about parameters) in the 544 generative model. 545
The key contribution of the current work is to link inference to the precision of beliefs about 546 parameters via learning. This addresses the issue of how model parameters are learned and updated 547 and allows an AI agent to make substantial changes to the architecture of its model in times when 548 environmental rules have shifted. The ensuing behaviour produces the archetypal phasic-tonic shifts 549 in LC dynamics, and links LC responses to the outcome of decision on stimuli, as suggested by in-vivo 550 recordings; summaries of which can be found in (4,11). 551
The difference between these two applications of Active Inference illustrates a broader point about 552 the way in which the theory is used to describe neuromodulation. Current versions of Active Inference 553 have conceived of neuromodulatory systems as reflections of precision, altering the weights assigned 554 
